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1. Introduction
Do contractionary fiscal policies, consisting in cut to government spending, produce
recessionary effects in the economic system? Or, instead, do these policies cause expansions
in economic activity? These are old debated issues in macroeconomics that, in the last
decade, have known a revival, mainly as a consequence of the so-called Great Recession
which hit the majority of industrialized countries and in the light of the related, dilemmatic
choices of fiscal policy faced by governments.
In this paper we aim to investigate these issues by focusing on a group of Euro-area
countries in which fiscal austerity has been forced in recent years both by the European
fiscal rules and by an economic and financial environment characterized by rising debt and
related fears concerning its sustainability. In particular, we concentrate attention on the
response of a key variable of the labour market, i.e. the unemployment rate, to national
government spending shocks.
Indeed, in recent years, the southern European countries - Greece, Italy, Portugal and
Spain - and Ireland have experienced a number of unprecedented economic shocks.
The favorable borrowing costs and cross-border financial integration prevailing under the
umbrella of the monetary union and, in the case of Ireland, a low corporate tax rate, have
attracted large capital inflows since the late Nineties. The external financing contributed
to growing current account deficits and fuelled bubbles in some sectors of the economy,
primarily the real estate market. As the financial crisis shattered the world economy in
2007, these countries found themselves exposed to falling real estate prices, plummeting
trading volumes in the universe of risky asset classes, and sudden stops in capital inflows.
In turn, the recapitalization of domestic financial institutions and the cost of welfare policies,
in place to mitigate the social fallout of the crisis, triggered a series of confidence shocks on
the sustainability of public finances and, more generally, on the viability of the Euro.
This sequence of events has generated renewed interest in understanding how similar
or different peripheral Euro-area countries are in terms of the shocks they are exposed to,
and their domestic transmission channels. It has also stimulated a debate centered on the
tension between the centralized conduct of monetary policy and domestic fiscal policies,
albeit implemented within a set of collective rules. In fact, for the first time European
policymakers faced unemployment at or above the levels last seen in the mid-Nineties, when
the common monetary system was not yet operational, raising questions about the most
effective policy tools available in a monetary union.
Against this background, by adopting a structural near-VAR approach, in this paper
we investigate the dynamic effects exerted by a selected set of exogenous shocks on some
key macroeconomic variables in the southern European peripheral economies and Ireland
during the first eighteen years of the EMU to derive insights that can guide policy actions. In
particular, we focus on the response of national unemployment rate to Euro-area monetary
policy shocks and to domestic fiscal policy shocks.
Although this near-VAR methodology has been previously used to investigate the role
of monetary policy shocks in small open economies, the novelty of this paper is to apply
this methodology in order to study the dynamic effects of monetary and fiscal shocks in the
peripheral Euro-area countries by jointly modeling Euro area and national variables.
To this end, we estimate a vector autoregressive model in which Greece, Ireland, Italy,
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Portugal and Spain are treated as small open economies acting in a monetary union. In
the context of the Euro area it is important to take into account the particular institutional
environment, with the conduct of monetary policy by the ECB at a supranational level, and
fiscal policy decisions taken by governments at the single-country level. We accomplish this
task by modeling both Euro area and national variables jointly, except that only the first
group of variables is allowed to exert an influence on the second one. The set of exogenous,
structural shocks is recovered by imposing a recursive structure.
Several interesting findings stem from our analysis. To start with, the effects of gov-
ernment spending shocks on unemployment vary considerably depending upon the country
investigated. In particular, our results are consistent with the predictions of the standard
New Keynesian model only in Italy and Greece; in Ireland, Portugal and Spain we identify
perverse effects of fiscal policy shocks on unemployment.
The core of these empirical results is substantially confirmed by estimating national
VAR models with full interaction among variables and in which an alternative identification
strategy of the national government spending shocks, based on sign restrictions, is adopted.
We are thus led to the conclusion that a better understanding of the macroeconomic out-
comes of fiscal shocks might require a separation of high public-debt countries (like Greece
and Italy) from high private-debt countries (like Ireland and Spain).
Moreover, and not less important, our results contrast some conclusions recently reached
in the literature. For example, Ilzetzki et al. (2013) find that fiscal stimuli exert recessionary
effects in a panel of countries affected by high public debt. Of course, these contrasting
results may be partially explained by the different sample periods considered. However, in
our opinion, another important explanation is in our choice to conduct the investigation
at the national level, since aggregate results obtained for selected group of countries might
obscure significant differences among them.
It is also worth recalling that Ireland was one of the two countries, the other being
Denmark, investigated by Giavazzi and Pagano (1990) in the 80s, where the authors found
evidence of expansionary effects associated with fiscal consolidations.
A recent survey on the identification of fiscal and other macroeconomic shocks is provided
by Ramey (2016).
The strand of the literature applying the structural VAR methodology to study the ef-
fects of fiscal shocks on aggregate output was initiated by Blanchard and Perotti (2002).
They investigated the postwar US economy and found results in line with the traditional
Keynesian interpretation of the role of fiscal policy in stabilizing business cycle fluctuations.
Similar results for the US economy are obtained by Mountford and Uhlig (2009). The au-
thors use a structural VAR in which government spending and revenue shocks are identified
by imposing sign restrictions on the responses of the variables. One of the first applications
of the sign restriction approach is provided in Rafiq and Mallick (2008), who investigated
the effects of monetary policy shocks in Germany, France and Italy.
Canova and Pappa (2011) have used a structural VAR model to investigate the dynamic
effects of government expenditure shocks on real activity in the United States, the Euro
area and the United Kingdom. One of the main points of the study is that fiscal policy may
exert large effects on the real economy in the presence of negative real interest rate, in turn
caused by accommodative monetary policy.
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In Leeper et al. (2010) a RBC model is estimated and fitted to US data in order to
analyze the role of fiscal financing for short-run and long-run multipliers. One of the main
findings of the paper is that these multipliers may differ deeply at the different horizons,
according to alternative strategies of fiscal financing.
In a recent paper, Leeper et al. (2015) have used a Bayesian approach to estimate fiscal
multipliers for the US economy. The authors build a monetary DSGE model and estimate
the fiscal multipliers by considering alternative monetary-policy stances.
Christiano et al. (2011) have suggested that the size of the government-spending multi-
plier is small in the presence of monetary policy choices driven by Taylor rules. Instead, the
size increases when the nominal interest rate is constant. The authors consider a particular
case of constant nominal rates related to a binding zero lower bound on nominal interest
rate. Nevertheless, having recognized the difficulties of empirically investigating the size
of the fiscal multipliers at the zero lower bound, the authors build a dynamic stochastic
general equilibrium model in order to draw plausible results on the government-spending
multipliers.
In a very recent paper, Wang (2018) studies the interactions between unconventional
monetary policy and fiscal policy in the U.S. and in Japan. The main finding is that the
macroeconomic effects of these interactions are larger in the U.S.
The importance of the interaction between monetary and fiscal policy is also detected
by Jawadi et al. (2016), who study the dynamic effects of monetary and fiscal policy
shocks on economic activity in the BRICS. They use a PVAR approach and show that
policy coordination causes a stronger recovery for economies hit by adverse macroeconomic
shocks.
Canzoneri et al. (2016) have recently shown, by using a theoretical model of the business
cycle with costly financial intermediation, that fiscal multipliers are much larger when the
economy is in a recessionary phase. The empirical findings in Fazzari et al. (2015), concern-
ing the US economy, show that government spending multipliers are bigger, and above one,
in times of low capacity utilization. Nevertheless, Ramey and Zubairy (2018) have recently
challenged these findings by showing that fiscal multipliers are smaller and, moreover, that
the size of multipliers does not depend on the degree of economic slackness.
However, in more recent years, a growing literature has broadened the scope of the anal-
ysis to include the dynamic effects of fiscal shocks on labor markets. Maybe not surprisingly,
the results presented by researchers are far from homogeneous.
Monacelli et al. (2010) provide estimates of both output and unemployment fiscal multipli-
ers for the postwar US economy using a structural VAR model. The exogenous innovations
are identified by imposing a contemporaneous causal ordering, with government spending
ordered first. The estimated unemployment multiplier, measured at the peak, equals 0.6,
i.e. an increase of 1 percent of GDP in government spending causes a maximum decrease of
0.6 percent in unemployment.
Brückner and Pappa (2012) find, instead, that fiscal expansions can increase unemployment,
both in the US economy and in other OECD countries. The authors show that, while the
sample specification can in some cases play a role in determining opposite outcomes, the
positive response of unemployment to expansionary fiscal shocks is robust to a number of
alternative identification strategies and model specifications. In the paper, a rationale for
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this puzzling outcome is offered by introducing worker heterogeneity and assuming that
outsider unemployment increases more than the reduction in insider unemployment.
Bermperoglu et al. (2013) investigate the effects of several categories of government outlays,
such as government consumption, investment, vacancies and wages in the US, UK, Japan
and Canada, and their conclusion is that contractionary shocks to government wages can
produce expansionary effects on output and reduce unemployment, while vacancy cuts lead
to output losses and increases in unemployment.
An interpretation of the heterogeneity of the results concerning the fiscal multipliers,
is given in Ilzetzki et al. (2013). The authors investigate the macroeconomic effects of
fiscal stimuli in 44 countries and show that both the sign and the amplitude of the fiscal
multipliers are strongly related to key country features. Particularly interesting, given the
group of countries studied in our paper, is the conclusion that fiscal multipliers are negative
in countries characterized by high debt.
Our investigation refines and partially modifies the conclusions by Ilzetzki et al. (2013):
countries’ financial fragility is confirmed as an important factor capable of influencing the
sign of the fiscal multipliers. Moreover, given the results observed for Ireland and Spain
in comparison to Italy and Greece, it seems that the presence of high indebtedness of the
private sector may play a role in generating non-Keynesian effects of fiscal policy.
In the present work, we choose to use the unemployment rate to describe the economic
cycle. Peripheral European countries have proved to be particularly vulnerable to the rapid
escalation of unemployment, which may stay persistently high even when upturns in out-
put materialize. A recovery in aggregate income that is not followed by a comparable
improvement in employment inevitably leads to increasing inequality which, according to
recent cross-country empirical evidence, hurts growth for given levels of redistribution (IMF,
2014). High unemployment also leads to human capital losses, is more likely to determine
social turmoil (Voth and Ponticelli, 2012), and leads to shortfalls in income that increase
economic volatility (Gerardi et al., 2013). Also, maximizing social welfare is typically part
of the political mandate that policymakers receive from the electorate, and is commonly
assumed among their preferences in a large class of economic models. Therefore, we believe
that a number of reasons make unemployment a relevant yardstick to assess the impact of
policy initiatives on the economy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 the econometric approach of
the paper is described. In particular, we present the main features of the estimated near-
VAR model and focus on the strategy to recover the structural shocks. In this section we
also report some descriptive statistics for the national economies. Section 3 presents the
econometric evidence organized in several subsections. Section 4 examines in more detail the
shocks that drive domestic unemployment. In section 5 we undertake a sensitivity analysis
in order to check for the robustness of the results obtained. In particular, local government
spending shocks are identified by imposing sign restrictions. Section 6 concludes and some
policy implications of our results are drawn.
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2. The estimated VAR model
Let us consider the following, general VAR specification:
A(L)Xt = et [1]
where Xt is a m × 1 vector of macroeconomic variables, including both Euro-area and
national variables, and et is the m × 1 vector of error terms, such that E(et) = 0 and
E(ete
′
t) = Σe. Moreover, L is the lag operator and A(L) is the m×m matrix polynomial in
L. For all the estimated VARs of the present research, we take m = 8.
We impose the restriction A12(L) = 0 and thus, for each of the countries included in the














WhereX1t andX2t have dimension, respectively,m1×1 andm2×1, A11(L) has dimension
m1 ×m1, A21(L) m2 ×m1, A22(L) m2 ×m2. Moreover, m1 +m2 = m.
More precisely, and in order to fix the notation, we have:
X ′1t = ( git pit uit spreadit )
with X1t 4×1 vector including national variables. The national variables included in the
near-VAR are government spending, git; the consumer price index, pit; the unemployment
rate, uit; and the differential between the yield on 10-year domestic government bonds and
the corresponding German bond, spreadit.
Government spending is constructed as the sum of government consumption and government
investment (see Blanchard and Perotti, 2002). This approach is justified in the light of the
fact that public spending on goods and services impacts aggregate demand directly.
The Euro-area variables are instead collected in the 4× 1 vector X2t:
X ′2t = ( pt ut it − i∗t ϵt )
Thus the second block of the model instead includes only Euro-area variables. These
are the Euro area consumer price index, pt, and the unemployment rate , ut, the differential
between the Eonia and the federal funds rate, it − i∗t , and the nominal exchange rate, ϵt,
defined as US dollars per currency units. The first two series proxy aggregate supply and
demand respectively. We use the differential between the Euro area and US short-term
interest rate in order to account for the relative stance of the ECB via-à-vis the Fed in
setting domestic monetary policy. In other words, the reaction function of the ECB is
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specified as a monetary rule for an open economy.1 As standard in the literature, we adopt
the short-term interest rates to measure the stance of monetary policy (see, e.g. Bernanke
and Mihov, 1998 and Taylor, 1999).
It is worth stressing that, as the Euro area-wide series remain the same across specifications,
the identified euro-wide shocks are invariant across simulations, allowing us to study the
domestic dynamics conditional on common impulses that are identical despite we estimate
a separate VAR system for each country.
The sample ideally covers the period of the EMU, although in practice it differs slightly
in some countries due to data availability constraints: the data start in 2002:Q1 for Ireland
and in 1999:Q1 in all remaining countries; the sample ends in 2016:Q3 for all countries.
The structural near-VAR that we adopt allows for a separation of the macroeconomic
variables into two distinct blocks: a first fully endogenous block, including national variables
unidirectionally caused by the Euro-area variables and a second exogenous block, including
only Euro-area variables.
We use block exogeneity restrictions in order to characterize the dynamic interaction
of small open economies which are part of the European Monetary Union (EMU) with
the area-wide economy. Cushman and Zha (1997) used the near-VAR model to study the
interaction between Canada (the small open economy) and the United States. In particular,
they used such a model to provide a sounder identification of the monetary policy shocks
affecting the small open economy in a context of flexible exchange rates.2
The fiscal variable, the consumer price index and the exchange rate enter the model in
natural logs and the interest rate differential in basis points. The model is specified with
the series in levels and includes a constant. The lag length is set to one, a choice which
strikes a balance between purging the residuals from autocorrelation and preserving as many
observations as possible, given the relatively short sample available. However, we stress that
the Schwarz information criterion provides support for this choice.3
In table 1 we report some descriptive statistics for the series included in the national
blocks. Clearly, even these simple statistics are able to describe the great instability that
affected the European peripheral economies in the last decade, as well as some differences
characterizing the selected group of macroeconomic indicators.4
1Indeed, the interactions between the ECB and the Fed in the first fifteen years of the EMU have been
substantial (see Scotti, 2011).
2Cavallo and Ribba (2015), in the context of EMU, have recently identified a structural near-VAR model
to study the dynamic effects of monetary policy shocks on industrial production in a group of Euro-area
countries in the first decade of the Euro. Other recent applications of this approach include, among others,
Givens and Reed (2018), Boecks et al. (2017) and Conti et al. (2017). Instead, as for open economies, a more
classical structural VAR approach to investigate sources of fluctuations in the UK is adopted for example in
Cover and Mallick (2012).
3In our estimation we consider a period of eighteen years and use quarterly data. Thus, given the
relatively small sample period we do not undertake the task of testing and identifying the possible existence
of long - run equilibrium relations among variables, given the difficulties in identifying the cointegration
space. However let us note that, in general, a Vector Error Correction Model can always be thought of as
a reparametrization of a VAR model specified in levels. In other words, even in the presence of long-run
relations, our near-VAR would not suffer from mis-specification.
4The presence of heterogeneity in the Euro Area, and the related problems for the smooth functioning
of the currency area, have been amply documented in recent years (see e.g. Cavallo and Ribba (2014)).
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Insert Table 1 about here
Estimation of system [2] by using OLS ensures consistent estimates. However, potential
gains might be obtained by estimation based on Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (SUR)
methods (Zellner 1962). We obtain the impulse response functions together with the confi-
dence bands by utilizing Monte Carlo integration techniques and the Gibbs sampling (Doan,
2010).
Having estimated the VAR reduced form [2], the next step is to recover the structural
shocks affecting the economic systems, both at the Euro-area and at the national level.
Thus, we first obtain the reduced-form moving average representation of system [2]:
Xt = C(L)et [3]
where C(0) = I.
Then, the structural shocks are recovered by imposing a contemporaneous recursive
structure to the estimated VAR model:
Xt = B(L)ηt [4]
Where B(L) = C(L)B and ηt = B
−1et. B is the Cholesky factor of Σe, i.e. is the unique
lower triangular matrix such that BB′ = Σe.
In particular, identification in the Euro area-wide block is achieved by assuming that
a monetary policy shock does not influence either the price level or unemployment within
the period; a demand shock exerts a delayed effect on prices; the exchange rate does not
exert a contemporaneous effect on the differential between Eonia and the federal funds rate
nor on other Euro area variables.5 This orthogonalization of the structural shocks is widely
adopted in the VAR literature studying the dynamic behaviour of large economies (see, for
example, Christiano et al., 1999 and Eichenbaum-Evans, 1995).
The recursive identification strategy also characterizes the recent structural VAR investiga-
tion on the US economy by Monacelli et al. (2010)
As for the domestic block, the government spending shock is backed out by assuming
that the government does not react within the same quarter to economic developments like
those in financial markets or in supply and demand, both at the national level and the Euro-
area level.6 While reasonable, this identification delivers a non-fundamental representation
if economic agents foresee the fiscal shocks - e.g. because it is announced in advance, or as
a result of delays in the process of parliamentary approval - and rationally respond to them
before the shock actually occurs.
Leeper et al. (2013) use tax policies as an important example of foresight and show that
output multipliers for taxes will be distorted if the econometric analyses neglect modelling
foresight. Evidence of fiscal foresight in some European countries has recently been provided
5Inverting the order of the monetary policy and the exchange rate series does not change the results.
6Similar identifying restrictions are adopted by, among others, Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and by
Monacelli et al. (2010).
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by Cavallari and Romano (2017).
Although the strategy of backing out the shock directly from the news narrative can help to
overcome the non-fundamentalness (Ramey, 2011), the time-series of news announcements
is not readily available for any of the countries in our dataset. Moreover, while effective
in dealing with the non-fundamentalness problem, the narrative approach may be subject
to biases in the distribution between expansionary and contractionary shocks that do not
seem to characterize the recursive identification scheme (Barnichon and Matthes, 2015). As
an alternative, leading indicators like stock prices and business confidence indexes can help
to recover the true sequence of structural shocks (Forni and Gambetti, 2014). To this end,
we add the composite index of the domestic stock market as an exogenous variable to each
country VAR model.
The remaining restrictions in the domestic block involve restricting to zero the contem-
poraneous response of the price level to a local aggregate demand shock, and ordering last in
the VAR the interest rate differential between national and German bonds, an assumption
consistent with the practice of considering financial variables as fast moving series that react
quickly to economic developments.
When referring to the unemployment multipliers, we mean the change in the unemploy-
ment rate for a given change in government spending. The multipliers can refer to any
horizon j, in which case they are constructed as:7




where U denotes unemployment and G the government series.
3. The effects of economic shocks in the Euro area periphery
Here we discuss our evidence. In order to economize on space and provide some struc-
ture to the discussion, we have organized this section in subsections. In particular, we
concentrate on the evidence concerning the common Euro area monetary policy shock and
the domestic fiscal shocks. When reporting the impulse response functions, we display the
median responses together with the error bands set at the 16th and the 84th percentiles
following Sims and Zha (1999).
However, before analyzing the responses of national variables to Euro area-wide and
national shocks, we briefly present the results concerning the responses of Euro-area con-
sumer prices and unemployment rate to Euro area-wide shocks. Although studying these
responses is not the focus of this investigation we report these results mainly in order to
allow a qualitative evaluation of the recursive identification strategy that we adopted both
in the exogenous block and in the local block of the VAR model.
7Another measure of fiscal multiplier, sometimes used in the literature, is the cumulative multiplier at









, (see IMF (2009)).
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3.1 Euro area-wide shocks effects on the Euro-area variables.
In figures from 1 to 3 the responses of prices and unemployment in the Euro area to,
respectively, supply shocks, demand shocks and monetary policy shocks are reported.
On the whole, it seems that the labels we attached to the identified shocks are consistent
with the conventional wisdom of the effects exerted by such macroeconomic shocks on prices
and unemployment. For, as shown in figure 1, following a positive supply shock, in the short
run there is an increase in unemployment which lasts for around five years.
Instead (Figures 2 and 3), both a negative aggregate demand shock and an unexpected
monetary policy tightening push prices and unemployment in opposite directions in the short
run, with a statistically-significant decrease in prices and an increase in unemployment.
Insert Figures 1-3 about here
3.2 Common monetary policy shock
An unexpected increase in the interest rate differential between the eonia and the federal
funds rate causes a statistically-significant decrease in domestic prices in all countries in-
cluded in the analysis except Spain, where the response of prices is not statistically significant
at all horizons. Instead, for the domestic unemployment rate, it increases in all countries
(Figure 4).
The contractionary monetary policy shock has the expected effects on the price level:
prices gradually fall, reaching the maximal effect between twelve and twenty-four quarters
after the shock. On impact, given the imposed zero restriction, the dynamic response of
the price level is muted across all countries, but differences emerge along the path back
to the long-term equilibrium. While in Greece, Italy and Portugal the price level shows
a significant and persistent decrease, in Ireland changes are not only smaller but also less
persistent. In Spain we find that the response is not statistically significant.
The transmission of a common monetary policy shock to unemployment rate in the pe-
ripheral economies is less homogeneous. Unemployment increases in response to the mone-
tary contraction in all countries but Greece. For, in Greece we find that despite an increase
in the median estimate, given the wide confidence bands, the response of unemployment
is not statistically-significant. In Italy and Spain we detect an increase in unemployment,
following the contractionary monetary policy shock, which lasts for around three years and
thereafter becomes non-significant. Instead, in Portugal and Ireland the response of the
unemployment rate has the expected sign for some periods, i.e. it increases, but the sign
reverses from positive to negative after three-four years.
Insert Figure 4 about here
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3.3 Domestic government spending shocks
Figure 5 collects the responses of the price level and the unemployment rate to a gov-
ernment spending shock.8
In Greece, an increase in government expenditures reduces unemployment and the maxi-
mal effect is reached eight quarters after the shock. The unemployment response is consistent
with the evidence obtained in Tagkalakis (2013) using a different sample of data. Thus, in
the case of Greece, we detect the presence of Keynesian effects associated with fiscal policy
under the EMU.
A similar conclusion holds for Italy, since unemployment falls in response to a positive gov-
ernment spending shock. The peak response is reached approximately three years after
the shock. However, the dynamic effects exerted by the fiscal shock remain significant for
further two years and hence they are characterized by persistence.
Greece and Italy are the only two cases where we find responses of unemployment fully
in line with the predictions of standard Keynesian models, i.e. increases in government
consumption and investment are expansionary.
On the contrary, the evidence for Ireland, Portugal and Spain supports the hypothesis that
expansionary fiscal policies can be detrimental to unemployment (Brückner and Pappa,
2012). The unemployment rate increases in these three countries in response to a positive
government spending shock. The increase in unemployment is more persistent in Portugal
and Spain, where it requires around three years for the effects to be vanished.
In table 2 we report the unemployment multipliers: these measure the change in the rate
of unemployment at various horizons in response to a one percent increase in government
expenditures. In Greece eight quarters are required to reach the maximum effect, and an
increase of one percent in government consumption and investment provokes a negative
change in the unemployment rate of 6.40 percent. In other words, on the basis of these
results, in order to obtain a reduction of one percent in the unemployment rate one would
need an increase of around sixteen percent in the level of government expenditures.
It is important to stress that these values of the unemployment multipliers seem to
suggest that although Greek fiscal austerity may have turned out to be costly, other im-
portant shocks on the demand and-or on the supply side, both at the national and the
Euro-area level, must have played a pre-eminent role as drivers of the unemployment rate
in the last decade. Indeed, this conclusion is supported by the results presented in section
4, in which we measure the relative importance of the identified macroeconomic shocks in
driving unemployment fluctuations.
In the other country that exhibits Keynesian effects, i.e. Italy, the size of unemployment
multipliers is similar to Greece and reaches its maximum value after twelve quarters. It is
also worth noting that on impact the unemployment multiplier in Italy is small and has a
positive sign. However, as shown by the impulse response functions, the impact effect on
unemployment of the fiscal shock is not significant.
In the remaining three, non-Keynesian, countries, we detect relatively sizeable fiscal
multipliers for Ireland and Spain at horizons of twenty-four quarters. In particular, in the
8We set the error bands at the 16th and the 84th percentiles. Nevertheless, setting, alternatively, the
error bands at the 10th and the 90th percentiles does not produce any qualitative change in the results
obtained.
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case of Spain, we find that an increase of one percent in government expenditures provokes
an increase in the rate of unemployment of around 0.20 percent after six years.
Insert Figure 5 about here
Insert Table 2 about here
3.4. Summing up
Recent empirical research has claimed that there is a strong relation between size and
signs of the fiscal multipliers and some, well selected countries’ characteristics (cf. Ilzetzki
et al. 2013), such as the degree of openness to trade and the size of public debt. Thus, in
general, there is no reason to expect homogeneity of conclusions when studying countries
which face different macroeconomic conditions.9
Our results, concerning the peripheral Euro-area countries, seem to point in exactly this
direction. Nevertheless, there are some important differences with respect to the conclusion
of Ilzetzki et al. (2013). For example we find that, at least for Greece and Italy, government
spending shocks cause an expansion of the economy, i.e. in response to these shocks there
is a decrease in unemployment and hence our results do not support the conclusion that
fiscal multipliers in countries affected by high public debt exhibit (always and everywhere)
a non-Keynesian sign.
On the other hand, we find that in Ireland, Portugal and Spain unemployment increases
in response to a positive government spending shock. Thus we are led to infer that the
conclusions reached by Ilzetzki et al. may require an integration: not only is sovereign debt
a potential, relevant factor in explaining ”perverse” effect of government spending shocks
but private debt is also likely to play a significant role. For, it is worth recalling that both
countries had to face a steady increase in private debt compared to domestic GDP in the
first decade of EMU. In particular, bubbles in real estate prices in the first part of 2000s
exposed these countries to serious financial fragilities.
It is also worth stressing that our results also contrast (at least partially) with the
conclusion recently reached by Canzoneri et al. (2016), since the authors argue that the
fiscal multipliers may be state-dependent and, by developing a theoretical model, show that
the multipliers are larger when the economy faces a recession. Nevertheless, according to
our empirical investigation, this conclusion is not always confirmed: public and private debt
levels, jointly with country financial conditions, also matter in determining size and signs
of fiscal multipliers and, at a pinch, in the presence of high level of debt the sign of fiscal
multipliers could be reversed.
In order to further investigate the robustness of these results, in section 5 we will present
a VAR analysis conducted at the country level in which the government spending shocks
are identified by imposing sign restrictions.
9On a more theoretical ground, Leeper et al. (2010) and Christiano et al. (2011) show that different
strategies of fiscal financing or alternative stances of monetary policy may cause deep differences in the size
of government spending multipliers.
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4. The drivers of unemployment
The implicit assumption underlying the identified structural VAR model is that changes
in the model’s variables are driven by a set of innovations which include both Euro-area
exogenous shocks, common to all countries, and national structural disturbances.
In particular, given the structural representation [4] and the orthonormality of the structural
disturbances, the variance of the forecasting error can be expressed as:
V ar(Xt+s − EtXt+s) = B0B′0 +B1B′1 +B2B′2 + ....+Bs−1B′s−1 [5]
The representation above is used to measure the relative importance of the various shocks
that drive unemployment fluctuations at various horizons in each country.
We focus on unemployment since in recent years fiscal policy has often been called
into question as a stabilization tool that governments can use to steer the domestic cycle,
as opposed to the nominal interest rate and exchange rate which respond to area-wide
aggregates in a monetary union.
In Table 3 we report the fraction of the forecast error variance of national unemployment
which is ascribable to the common Euro area monetary policy shock. Further, in Tables 4
to 8 we have collected the contribution of each national structural shock in composing the
variation of national unemployment at different horizons. The main takeaways from these
tables are discussed below.
First, in all countries, unemployment appears to be a highly idiosyncratic phenomenon
in the very short run, when the great part of its variation is usually ascribed to the shock
itself. For example, the demand shock explains 96.2 percent of the forecast error variance
in the first quarter in Italy, 92.8 in Greece, 92.2 in Spain, 91.7 in Portugal and 82.1 in
Ireland.10
Second, fiscal policies have the largest effect on the dynamics of unemployment in the
short and medium run. Such an effect looks quantitatively larger in Greece and Portugal:
in these two countries at horizons from two to three years the government spending shock
explains around 30 percent of the variability of unemployment rate. With respect to Greece
and Portugal, in Ireland, Italy and Spain the overall importance of the government spending
shock, though non-negligible, is smaller.
Instead, as shown in Table 3, the common monetary policy shock plays a relevant role as
driver of national unemployment in all peripheral EMU countries. Its relative contribution
grows steadily over the forecast horizon: if, for example, we look at the horizon of 24 quarters
we find that this shock explains from a minimum of 9.5 percent in Portugal, to a maximum
of 23.8 percent in Ireland. Although in Portugal the role of the monetary policy shock
tends to be consistently smaller than in the other countries across horizons, it explains 11.8
percent percent of the forecast error variance in the 40th quarter.
Thus, according to our results, the short answer to whether fiscal policy is the appropriate
tool to temporarily mitigate the unemployment problems in peripheral European countries
10Although we do not separately investigate the role played by private consumption and investment, these
results are consistent with the narrative that assigns a pre-eminent role to the collapse of aggregate demand
in explaining the deep recession experienced in these countries in 2007 and beyond.
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is yes, but conditionally on the domestic financial conditions, because it mostly affects the
short-run dynamics of unemployment fluctuations. However, it is unlikely that fiscal policy
can significantly curb unemployment, since factors pertaining to the domestic business cycle
and labor market and the centralized conduct of monetary policy have a stronger role since
the onset of the monetary union.
Turning to the financial shock11, it is worth noting that its share in the forecast error
decomposition exhibits quite sizeable values in Greece, Portugal and Spain, reaching a peak
at 12 quarters in all the three countries. Of course, this is far from surprising in the light
of the economic events of recent years concerning sovereign debt concerns. Maybe more
surprising is the limited role played by the financial shock at all horizons in Ireland.
Insert Table 3 about here
Insert Tables from 4 to 8 about here
5. An alternative identification strategy of government spending shocks
In this section we aim to check the robustness of our previous conclusions on the macroe-
conomic effects of government spending shocks in the peripheral Euro-area countries. To
this end, we recover the national government spending shocks by using an alternative iden-
tification strategy, based on sign restrictions.
It is worth stressing that the conclusion that, under certain conditions, fiscal consolida-
tions may cause expansionary effects on the economic system is not new, since Giavazzi and
Pagano (1990) found non-Keynesian effects of fiscal policy in two small European economies,
i.e. Ireland and Denmark, in the 80s. More recently, evidence of increases in aggregate out-
put in a group of OECD countries, following government spending cuts, has also been
presented in Alesina and Ardagna (2010). Furthermore, the results presented in Ilzetzki
et al. (2013) have shown that non-Keynesian effects of government spending shocks may
characterize countries affected by high public debt.
As shown in table 1, the countries considered in the present investigation are affected
by high public debt-to-GDP-ratio, as per Greece and Italy, or by high private debt-to-Gdp
ratio, as per Ireland and Spain. Instead, Portugal has suffered from both high private and
public debt over the EMU period. Let us recall that beside the time-honoured threshold
of 60 percent for the public debt,12 in recent years the European Commission has also
established a threshold for the private debt-to-GDP-ratio of 160 percent, within a set of
indicators of potential macroeconomic imbalances. Over the EMU period, Greece, Italy and
Portugal have had an average value for public debt well above 60 percent. Ireland, Portugal
and Spain exhibited private debt-to-GDP-ratio well above 160 percent, on average in the
case of Ireland and Portugal, and in the majority of years during the EMU in the case of
11Mallick and Sousa (2013) study the macroeconomic impact of financial stress in the Eurozone. They
emphasize the importance to identify both monetary policy shocks and financial stress shocks.
12In their empirical investigation, Ilzetzki et al. (2013) use the threshold of 60 percent in order to select
countries affected by high public debt.
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Spain. On the other hand, Greece and Italy did not show worrying levels of private debt
(relative to the established threshold) over the sample period and the same conclusion holds
for Ireland and Spain as far as public debt is concerned.
According to the relevant literature, the emergence of non-Keynesian effects of fiscal
shocks is related to the possibility that the private sector may increase expenditures in
response to government spending cuts and that such increase offset the recessionary effects
of spending cuts. Thus, the main conclusion reached by this strand of the literature is
that credible fiscal consolidations are capable of raising the confidence of consumer and
business sectors, which in turn induces an increase in aggregate consumption and investment.
Moreover, if interest rates decrease in response to the government spending cut, this causes
a further increase in private spending. The empirical results presented so far seem to point
to the conclusion that these outcomes are more likely to occur in countries in which the
private sector is heavily indebted.
Indeed, in these economies it is reasonable to expect a stronger reaction of both confi-
dence and spending of the private sector to sizeable contraction of interest rates: government
spending cuts, by decreasing the interest rates paid on government bonds, favor the diffusion
of these contractionary effects to interest rates paid by consumers and businesses and thus
stimulate an increase in private spending, at the same time improving the confidence on the
sustainability of private debt.
5.1 Identification based on imposing sign restrictions
We estimate for each country a VAR model including eight variables and recover the
government spending shock by imposing sign restrictions. More precisely, we impose a
negative sign on government expenditures and leave free the response of the other variables,
i.e. the consumer price index, the unemployment rate, an index of the domestic stock
market, the spread between the yield on 10-years domestic government bonds and the 10-
years German bond, Euro-area consumer price index and unemployment rate, the differential
between the Eonia and the federal funds rate.
Note that, following the prediction of new-Keynesian models, it is quite common in
fiscal VAR models to impose a negative (or positive) sign on both government spending
and output or, alternatively, a positive sign on unemployment in response to contractionary
fiscal shocks. However, in the context of the present investigation this strategy would have
little sense, since we want to empirically discover the sign of the response of unemployment,
i.e. since we adopt a let the data speak approach.
We must add that, by imposing sign restrictions, possible concerns regarding the pre-
dictability of fiscal shocks are mitigated since the identification scheme does not require
contemporaneous exogeneity of fiscal variables. In other words, there are no lags between
approval of fiscal packages and implementation of policy decisions.
Following Mountford and Uhlig (2009), in addition to the fiscal shock, we also identify
a (national) business cycle shock, by imposing opposite signs on prices and unemployment,
and a common Euro-area monetary policy shock, by imposing that an increase in the interest
rate (more precisely, an increase in the differential between Eonia and federal funds rate) is
associated with a negative sign in the Euro-area consumer price index.
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We utilize the methodological approach proposed by Uhlig (2005) and extended by
Mountford and Uhlig (2009), and estimate for each country the following reduced-form
VAR model: Xt = A1Xt−1 + et. Let PP
′ = Σe be a factorization of the covariance matrix
of error terms, Σe. We identify a set of impulse vectors, p
1..pn, such that pi = Piα
i, where
∥αi∥ = 1. Thus, each impulse vector, pi, is a column of P. The number, r, of identified
shocks, is smaller than m, the number of total shocks that is possible to recover. In the
present context, given m = 8, r = 3 macroeconomic shocks are identified.
Figure 6 shows the response of domestic prices and unemployment rate to a domestic,
contractionary government spending shock. We find a clear confirmation of the main results
obtained in section 3: Greece and Italy show Keynesian effects associated with fiscal policy,
since the unemployment rate increases for many quarters in response to the government
spending cut, while in Ireland, Portugal and Spain in response to the fiscal contraction
there is both a significant and persistent decrease in the unemployment rate.
The responses of prices are more heterogeneous and also less clear in their interpretation.
For, in Greece, Ireland and Italy the response of prices to the contractionary spending shock
is almost non significant at all horizons, while in Portugal and Spain there is a significant
decrease in the price level which lasts for around three years after the shock.
As far as the contractionary Euro-area monetary policy shock is concerned, the results
are similar to those obtained in section 3. In particular, we want to draw the attention on
the fact that, although we dot impose restrictions on the response of national prices, their
response does not exhibit a wrong sign in any country. In other words, we do not face a
price puzzle, since prices decrease in response to the monetary tightening in all countries.
Insert Figure 6 and 7 about here
6. Conclusion and some policy implications
The main contribution of this paper was to characterize how unemployment responses
to national fiscal shocks and to common, Euro-area monetary policy shocks vary across a
group of peripheral European countries. Our findings can be summarized as follows.
To start with, the dynamic effects of government spending shocks on unemployment are
fully consistent with the predictions of the New Keynesian economic theory only in Italy
and Greece. In Ireland, Portugal and Spain we identify perverse, non-Keynesian effects of
fiscal policy shocks on unemployment.
The bulk of these conclusions turned out to be robust to alternative identification strate-
gies of the structural shocks.
On the whole, these results seem to point to the relevance of countries’ financial fragility
as an important factor capable of influencing the sign of the fiscal multipliers. Moreover,
given the results observed for Ireland, Portugal and Spain in comparison to Italy and Greece,
it seems that even private debt plays an eminent role besides the public one, recently em-
phasized by Itzetki et al. (2013). It is worth stressing that our results seem also to point to
the conclusion that in countries characterized by the presence of high indebtedness of the
private sector a fiscal tightening is more likely to produce a significant reaction of private
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demand, i.e. an increase of private spending, which may counterbalance the public spend-
ing cut. At this stage, we believe this is a potential interesting empirical result in search
of theory. Thus we are confident that our results may stimulate further research on this
subject, both on the theoretical and the empirical side.
Turning to monetary policy shocks, we find that centralized monetary impulses, at the
Euro-area level, exert significant effects on the national unemployment rates and, moreover,
the responses have the expected sign: contractionary monetary policy shocks push the
national economies into recession.
When we measure the relative importance of the identified structural shocks in driving
unemployment changes at different horizons, we find that unemployment fluctuations are
primarily idiosyncratic in the short run in all investigated countries. Government spending
shocks seem to have played a sizeable role in explaining short and medium-run unemploy-
ment fluctuations in Greece and Portugal. As far as Greece is concerned, given the detected
Keynesian sign of the response of unemployment to fiscal shocks, the important implication
is that the fiscal austerity, particularly strong in recent years, has produced quite costly
consequences in the labor market.
As for Ireland, Italy and Spain, though statistically-significant, the relative importance
of government spending shocks exhibits smaller amplitude. Instead, as far as the longer
term is concerned, the Euro area-wide shocks are the dominant drivers, with an important
role played by common monetary policy shocks.
If we take the empirical results obtained in this study as a good guide for macroeconomic
policies, the most important implications are: (1) the expansionary policies undertaken by
the ECB in recent years can help the labor market of peripheral economies to recover from
the current downturn; (2) fiscal policy conducted at national level in the small Euro-area
economies cannot be viewed as an efficient macroeconomic stabilization tool, first in the
light of the uncertainty characterizing the sign of the response of unemployment to changes
in fiscal policy, and second given the pre-eminent role played by other national and common
Euro-area shocks in driving business cycle fluctuations in these economies.
Thus, if fiscal policy is a quite uncertain stabilization tool in Euro-area countries, we
would conclude that the burden of macroeconomic stabilization should rest rest only on the
ECB. However in recent years, researchers, some European governments (e.g. in France)
and the European Commission, have pointed out the importance of a centralized Euro-area
fiscal budget, even for purposes of macroeconomic stabilization, since in the presence of
strong adverse shocks, as those experienced in the last decade, monetary policy tools may
not be sufficient (see e.g. European Commission 2017).
Our results, although indirectly, give support to this strategy by showing that govern-
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Figure 1: Responses of Euro-area CPI and unemployment to area-wide supply shocks
Figure 2: Responses of Euro-area CPI and unemployment to area-wide demand shocks
Figure 3: Responses of Euro-area CPI and unemployment to monetary policy shocks
Notes. Impulse responses to a one standard deviation shock. Error bands set at 68th percent confidence
interval.
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Figure 4. Responses of national variables to a monetary policy shock
Note. Responses of domestic prices and unemployment rate, to a contractionary common monetary
policy shock. Errors bands set at the 16th and the 84th percentiles.
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Figure 5. Responses of national variables to a government spending shock
Note. Responses to a domestic, government spending shock. Responses of prices and unemployment for
the national economies. Errors bands set at the 16th and the 84th percentiles.
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Figure 6. Responses of national variables to a government spending shock
Note. Responses to a domestic, contractionary government spending shock. Identification by sign re-
strictions. Responses of prices and unemployment for the national economies. Errors bands set at the
16th and the 84th percentiles.
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Figure 7. Responses of national variables to a contractionary monetary policy shock
Note. Responses of domestic prices and unemployment rate to a contractionary common monetary policy
shock. Identification by sign restrictions. Error bands set at 68th percent confidence interval.
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics for the national economies.
Variables Greece Ireland Italy Portugal Spain
πt 2.18 (1.92) 1.85 (1.99) 1.89 (1.07) 2.04 (1.46) 2.18(1.57)
ut 15.0 (6.99) 8.53 (4.46) 9.46 (2.07) 9.55 (3.99) 16.04 (6.05)
gt
yt
24.58 (1.71) 19.79 (2.68) 21.78 (1.0) 23.10 (1.91) 22.0 (1.59)
publ.debtt
yt
130.2 (33.2) 59.3 (35.1) 111.13 (13.8) 84.9 (30.5) 62.1(22.1)
priv.debtt
yt
94.8 (33.0) 214.2 (56.1) 101.8 (19.8) 174.4 (29.1) 154.7(39.2)
spreadt 442.5 (581.4) 128.1 (192.32) 107.4 (114.2) 194.7 (273.8) 101.56 (137.79)
Note: The table presents for each series the mean and the standard deviation (in parenthesis). πt is built






respectively, of government spending and government revenues to gdp. gt is constructed as the sum of
government consumption and government investment; spreadt is constructed as the differential between the
yield on 10-years domestic government bonds and the corresponding German bond. Private sector debt is
given by the stock of liabilities held by the sectors Non-financial corporations and households.
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Table 2. Unemployment multipliers to a government spending shock.
Horizon Greece Ireland Italy Portugal Spain
1 -1.18 2.86 0.39 0.81 5.38
4 -5.41 0.02 -4.28 3.95 6.15
8 -6.40 -1.65 -5.50 3.54 8.46
12 -5.20 -0.94 -6.11 1.48 11,54
24 1.25 6.28 -5.16 -2.43 18.46
Note: The table presents the response of unemployment to a one percent positive shock in government




U denotes unemployment rate and G government spending.
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Table 3. Fraction of the forecast error variance at various horizons of national unemployment
attributable to the common, Euro-area monetary policy shock.
Horizon Greece Ireland Italy Portugal Spain
1 0 0 0 0 0
4 0.4 (0.1,0.6) 3.6 (1.7,6.1) 3.3 (1.2,6.2) 2.1 (0.6,4.8) 10.4 (5.8, 16.1)
8 1.6 (0.2,6.2) 3.5 (1.1,8.2) 8.2 (2.3,17.0) 3.9 (0.8,10.8) 11.8 (3.6,26.5)
12 4.2 (0.7,13.7) 4.1 (2.3,6.8) 9.6 (2.6,23.0) 3.4 (1.2,10.4) 8.2 (4.2,19.3)
24 15.6 (4.3,31.5) 23.8 (14.6,31.9) 12.2 (4.8,26.1) 9.5 (2.9,21.0) 22.0 (7.9,39.4)
40 19.3 (6.7,34.8) 24.7 (15.1,33.2) 14.6 (5.7,28.4) 11.8 (3.9,24.5) 28.3 (12.9,44.5)
Note: The table presents the fraction of variability of unemployment at various horizons and for each country
which is due to the Euro-area monetary policy shock. In parentheses are reported the error bands set to the
16th and the 84th percentiles.
Table 4. Fraction of the forecast error variance of unemployment attributable to government
spending shock and to other national shocks: Greece.
Horizon Government Spending Supply Demand Financial
1 5.0 (1.6,10.0) 1.4 (0.2,4.4) 92.8 (87.0,96.9) 0
4 29.2 (19.9,38.9) 0.9 (0.3,2.1) 51.2 (42.4,60.6) 12.3 (8.1,17.2)
8 28.0 (17.9,38.3) 1.7 (0.5,5.0) 28.0 (20.0,36.9) 25.4 (17.3,34.6)
12 22.6 (13.2,33.1) 3.2 (0.7,8.5) 17.9 (11.2,25.9) 28.8 (18.2,40.6)
24 14.6 (7.6,23.8) 5.8 (1.7,11.8) 11.0 (5.9.17.2) 21.3 (11.2,34.7)
40 12.6 (6.3,22.2) 5.0 (1.7,10.0) 8.9 (4.7,14.8) 20.4 (10.1,33.4)
Note: For each country, the total variance of the forecast error for unemployment is computed and then
decomposed in the part attributable to each structural shock (cf. formula [4]). The table presents the fraction
of variability at various horizons which is due to the five national macroeconomic shocks. In parentheses are
reported the error bands set to the 16th and the 84th percentiles.
Table 5. Fraction of the forecast error variance of unemployment attributable to government
spending shocks and to other national shocks: Ireland.
Horizon Government Spending Supply Demand Financial
1 13.6 (7.0 ,21.5) 3.0 (0.7,7.3) 82.1 (74.2,89.4) 0
4 6.0 (3.1,11.8) 2.5 (1.3,4.5) 71.7 (64.5,77.5) 0.7 (0.1,2.6)
8 5.2 (3.4,11.6) 4.0 (1.2,9.7) 43.6 (33.8,53.9) 1.4 (0.4,4.9)
12 4.5 (1.6,12.9) 3.0 (0.9,9.1) 32.3 (22.4,43.6) 2.2 (0.6,6.9)
24 4,1 (1.2,14.3) 3.9 (1.5,8.5) 26.4 (17.1,36.2) 2.0 (0.4, 6.4)
40 4.5 (0.9,16.0) 4.6 (1.5,10.3) 25.9 (16.5,36.0) 1.7 (0.5,5.3)
Note: See Table 4.
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Table 6. Fraction of the forecast error variance of unemployment attributable to fiscal shocks
and to other national shocks: Italy.
Horizon Expenditures Supply Demand Financial
1 0.7 (0.1,2.9) 2.3 (0.4,6.5) 96.2 (91.7,98.8) 0
4 6.7 (2.5,13.6) 1.9 (0.4,5.9) 78.4 (70.5,85.0) 0.5 (0.1,1.9)
8 10.4 (3.6,20.2) 2.1 (0.5,6.8) 55.7 (43.4,67.9) 2.0 (0.3,8.6)
12 12.3 (4.2,23.7) 2.5 (0.6,7.7) 41.2 (27.3,55.8) 4.0 (0.5,16.5)
24 13.5 (1.0,25.7) 3.5 (0.9,10.2) 24.6 (13.6,39.5) 8.1 (1.2,26.3)
40 12.8 (5.0,22.7) 4.5 (1.3,11.8) 20.4 (10.5,34.2) 9.5 (2.1,23.0)
Note: See Table 4.
Table 7. Fraction of the forecast error variance of unemployment attributable to fiscal shocks
and to other national shocks: Portugal.
Horizon Expenditures Supply Demand Financial
1 2.8 (0.5,6.8) 4.5 (1.4,9.4) 91.7 (86.0,96.1) 0
4 33.8 (25.7,42.4) 3.8 (2.1,6.0) 40.2 (33.3,48.1) 15.6 (10.4,21.8)
8 28.1 (18.6,39.5) 8.4 (4.4,13.5) 14.0 (10.4,18.1) 29.5 (19.3,40.2)
12 15.6 (8.4,26.7) 9.1 (4.2,15.1) 10.3 (6.4,15.6) 30.4 (18.7,43.7)
24 8.1 (3.6,15.6) 4.5 (1.6,,10.1) 8.5 (3.7,14.7) 16.6 (16.5,29.5)
40 7.8 (3.1,15.4) 3.5 (1.3,7.9) 6.5 (2.6,12.4) 15.6 (7.5,27.8)
Note: See Table 4.
Table 8. Fraction of the forecast error variance of unemployment attributable to fiscal shocks
and to other national shocks: Spain.
Horizon Expenditures Supply Demand Financial
1 3.8 (1.0,8.5) 2,9 (0.5,7.1) 92.2 (88.6.,96.4) 0
4 4.8 (1.5,10.0) 1.7 (0.3,3.8) 64.0 (55.5,71.8) 8.8 (4.2,14.7)
8 4.1 (1.1,10.3) 1.5 (0.5,4.4) 29.7 (20.9,40.1) 22.1 (11.4,33.6)
12 3.9 (0.8,10.6) 1.5 (0.5,5.0) 18.4(10.9,28.9) 24.3 (12.5,37.5)
24 4.2 (0.6,12.9) 2.3 (0.5,7.5) 14.2 (6.3,24.6) 12.9 (5.0,25.5)
40 4.8 (0.8,11.8) 3.4 (0.7,9.6) 12.2 (4.6,22.3) 9.2 (3.0,20.2)
Note: See Table 4.
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Data Appendix
Most data come from Eurostat and from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. The
list of the relevant series follow below:
• Euro-Area Variables
– Prices: Euro Area (19 Countries) Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices is col-
lected from European Central Bank at a quarterly frequency. The reference year
is 2015.
– Unemployment rate: Data on unemployment rate were taken from FRED’s
site, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
– Interest rate differential: The variable is the difference between the European
overnight interest rate (Eonia) and the US Federal Funds rate, both series have
a quarterly frequency. The former is the short term interest rate collected from
Eurostat by using the Money market interest rates database. The latter is re-
trieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
– Exchange rate: The Euro/ECU exchange rate is collected from Eurostat. Data
are quarterly and expressed as US dollars per currency unit.
• Countries Variables:
The countries included in this investigation are Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and
Spain. For each country the following variables are used:
– Government expenditures: The government expenditures variable is obtained,
for each country, as the sum of government consumption and government in-
vestment. Data are collected from Eurostat, using the Quarterly non-financial
account for general government. After collecting data at a quarterly frequency,
firstly, they were seasonally adjusted and transformed in real terms using coun-
try GDP deflator; secondly, the sum of government consumption and government
investment was made in order to obtain the government spending variable.
– Prices: The Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices of each country is collected
from European Central Bank at a quarterly frequency. The reference year is 2015.
– Unemployment rate: Data on unemployment rate were taken from FRED’s
site, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
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– Output: The nominal gross domestic product is collected, for each country, from
Eurostat by using the GDP and main components database at a quarterly fre-
quency.
– Domestic stock market index: Domestic stock market indexes are collected
from Datastream at a quarterly frequency. In particular, for Greece we use the
GR Athens Stock Exchange General Share Price Index; for Ireland we use the
IR Price Index; for Italy we use the FTSE MIB INDEX, for Portugal we use the
PSI 20 Index and for Spain we use the IBEX 35 Index. Data were adjusted for
seasonality by using the moving average technique.
– Private sector debt: The Private sector debt, in consolidated terms, is the
stock of liabilities held by the sectors Non-financial corporations and households.
Data are collected from Eurostat by using the Financial Sheet database at a
yearly frequency.
– Public sector debt: The Public sector debt, in consolidated terms, is the gov-
erment gross debt. Data are provided, for each country, by Eurostat using the
Quarterly government debt database.
– Spread: The spread is built as the difference between the yield on 10-years na-
tional government bond and the corresponding German bond. Data come from
Eurostat by using EMU convergence criterion database at a quarterly frequency.
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